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This paper analyses debt relief efforts by creditors to alleviate the debt burden of low-income 
countries. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative builds on traditional debt 
relief, and for the first time involves relief on multilateral debt. It seeks to reduce debt to 
sustainable levels and eliminate any debt overhang that might hinder growth and investment. 
It provides substantial debt relief to eligible countries by reducing their overall debt stocks by 
about one-half, or, together with traditional relief over time, by some 80 percent. It lowers 
debt service payments of HIPCs substantially, provides room for increased social spending, 
and provides a solid basis for debt sustainability. The latter requires efforts by both debtors 
and creditors. To find poverty reduction efforts, HIPC relief is important, but much broader 
international support is needed as external transfers to HIPCs in the past far exceeded debt 
service paid. Experience has shown that external support can only be effective if it reinforces 
sound policies implemented by HIPCs themselves. Thus debt relief and ODA are most 
important not in isolation, but as help for self-help. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
 
The external debt levels of low-income countries have mounted over the last two decades. At 
the same time, efforts have intensified to alleviate this burden. Since the late 1980s, when 
industrial countries first agreed to reschedule low-income countries’ debts on concessional 
terms in the context of the Paris Club (Toronto terms), the degree of debt forgiveness (grant 
element) has been increased in several steps. By the mid-1990s, under what came to be 
known as Naples terms, Paris Club creditors were forgiving two-thirds of low-income 
countries’ eligible debts. Despite these efforts, some low-income countries, especially those 
in sub-Saharan Africa, continued to face heavy external debt burdens and difficulties with 
servicing them, sometimes repeatedly resorting to debt rescheduling. This often reflected a 
combination of factors, including a lack of perseverance with structural and economic reform 
programs, a deterioration in their terms of trade, poor governance, and also a willingness of 
creditors to continue to provide new loans. 
 
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, launched in September 1996 by the 
IMF and the World Bank, is an evolution of traditional debt relief efforts. Unlike them, 
however, the HIPC Initiative involves for the first time debt relief from multilateral financial 
institutions. The Initiative’s main purpose is the reduction of eligible countries’ external debt 
burdens to sustainable levels and the elimination of any debt overhang that might be a 
hindrance to growth and investment. The Initiative was reviewed and enhanced in late 1999 
to provide faster and deeper debt relief to a larger number of countries. The enhanced 
Initiative is expected to benefit close to 40 low-income countries, of which 23 have reached 
their decision points and have started to receive debt relief as of July 2001.  
 
The enhanced HIPC Initiative provides substantial debt relief to eligible countries by 
reducing their overall debt stocks by about one-half. Three points should be noted. First, this 
builds on debt reduction under traditional mechanisms over the last decade or so, which 
already reduced debts by about half for the countries that are expected to require HIPC relief. 
Combining traditional and HIPC relief over time, the external debt of these countries will be 
reduced in total by some 80 percent. Second, the Initiative lowers debt service payments for 
the 23 decision point HIPCs on average by about one-third to 8 percent of exports—this is 
less than half the debt service ratio paid by other developing countries. While debt service 
payments by HIPCs are declining, social spending is increasing and projected to reach more 
than three times the level of debt service payment by 2002. Third, the Initiative provides a 
solid basis for HIPCs to achieve debt sustainability and to exit the rescheduling cycle. It is a 
major step, but maintaining debt at sustainable levels over time is a more complex 
undertaking—which requires efforts both by debtors, on the one hand, and creditors and 
donors, on the other. For this, it is essential that debtors pursue sound economic policies, 
including good debt management. It is also essential that creditors/donors are ready to 
support HIPCs by providing adequate resources on appropriately concessional terms. 
 
The Initiative is primarily concerned with achieving debt sustainability, but at the same time 
resources freed up by debt relief are to be channeled toward social expenditure and other 
poverty-reduction programs. In light of the latter and given that the countries targeted are   - 5 - 
among the poorest in the world, there has been ample discussion on the HIPC Initiative’s 
ability to make a substantial contribution to poverty reduction. It is important to keep the 
broader context in mind, namely that recent historical gross resource flows to HIPCs were 
three and a half times the level of debt service payments made. Thus in terms of these 
countries’ future resource needs in support of their poverty reduction strategies (PRSPs), the 
contribution of the HIPC Initiative is important, but much broader international support is 
needed. Experience has shown that external support can only be effective if it reinforces 
sound policies implemented by HIPCs themselves and leads to higher resources being 
directed to social development and poverty reduction. Debt relief and ODA are most 
important not in isolation, but as help for self-help. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses debt relief initiatives for 
low-income countries and their impact in terms of debt-stock reduction. Section 3 examines 
the flow impact of debt relief, and discusses its significance in terms of resources flows to 
HIPCs. Section 4 comments on the debt sustainability outlook and more broadly on the HIPC 
Initiative’s contribution to, and the required international support for, poverty reduction. 
 
 
II.   DEBT RELIEF INITIATIVES FOR LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES—DEBT STOCK PERSPECTIVE 
 
A.   Evolution of Debt Stocks 
 
The overall debt level of low-income countries rose significantly in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Figure 1). For the group of 41 HIPCs, the level of debt tripled from under US$60 billion in 
1980 to a peak of about US$190 billion in 1995, then declined somewhat to about 
US$170 billion by 1999. In contrast, the level of debt of all developing countries, and even of 
all low-income countries (LICs), continued to rise throughout the same period.
2  
 
The creditor composition of debt varies greatly: while private creditors have been the largest 
creditor group of all developing countries, their exposure to LICs, and even more so to 
HIPCs, increased slowly in the 1980s, but was stagnant for LICs in the 1990s and declined 
sharply for HIPCs, especially those 23 HIPCs that have pursued economic policies that 
allowed them to benefit from debt relief early on. At the same time, bilateral creditors remain 
the second largest creditor for all developing countries, and the largest creditor of LICs and 
HIPCs; as bilateral debt stocks have started to decline since the mid-1990—reflecting 
bilateral debt forgiveness as well as the beginning of stock-of-debt reduction packages from 
the Paris Club—multilateral creditors, whose exposure has risen steadily to all four country 
groups, have become the largest creditor group of the 23 decision point HIPCs. 
                                                 
2 See Table 1 for a list of the countries in these groupings. Figure 1: Total Public External Debt in Selected Country Groups, 1981 - 1999
By Creditor;  In billions of U.S. dollars
Multilateral creditors (left scale) Bilateral creditors (left scale) Private creditors (left scale)
Source: World Bank Global Development Finance, 2001.
1/  A group of 149 countries covered by the GDF.  Of these, 137 report to the DRS, while World Bank estimates are used for the others.
2/  A group of 64 countries for which 1999 GNP per capita was no more than $755 as calculated by the World Bank. Of these, 62 report to the DRS.
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Table 1: Developing Country Classification, 2001
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) Other Developing Countries 1/
Low Income 2/                         Middle-income 3/
Decision Point reached by July 2001 Afghanistan, I.S. of  6/ Albania Lebanon
Benin Armenia Algeria Libya  6/
Bolivia 4/ Azerbaijan Antigua & Barbuda  6/ Lithuania
Burkina Faso Bangladesh Argentina Macedonia, FYR
Cameroon Bhutan Bahrain  6/ Malaysia
Chad Cambodia Barbados Maldives
Gambia, The Comoros Belarus Malta
Guinea Eritrea Belize Mauritius
Guinea-Bissau Georgia Bosnia and Herzegovina Mexico
Guyana 4/ Haiti Botswana Morocco
Honduras 4/ India Brazil Namibia  6/
Madagascar Indonesia Bulgaria Oman
Malawi Korea, D.P.R  6/ Cape Verde Panama
Mali Kyrgyz Republic Chile Papua New Guinea
Mauritania Lesotho China Paraguay
Mozambique Moldova Colombia Peru
Nicaragua Mongolia Costa Rica Philippines
Niger Nepal Croatia Poland
Rwanda Nigeria Cuba Romania
São Tomé and Príncipe Pakistan Czech Republic Russian Federation
Senegal Solomon Islands Djibouti Samoa
Tanzania Tajikistan Dominica Saudi Arabia  6/
Uganda Turkmenistan Dominican Republic Seychelles
Zambia Ukraine Ecuador Slovak Republic
Decision Point not yet reached Uzbekistan Egypt South Africa
Burundi Zimbabwe El Salvador Sri Lanka
Central African Republic Equatorial Guinea St. Kitts and Nevis
Congo, Democratic Republic of Estonia St. Lucia
Congo, Republic of Fiji St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Cote d'Ivoire 5/ Gabon Suriname  6/
Ethiopia Gibraltar  6/ Swaziland
Ghana Grenada Syrian Arab Republic
Lao People's Democratic Republic Guatemala Thailand
Liberia Hungary Tonga
Myanmar Iran, Islamic Republic of Trinidad and Tobago




Sustainable cases Kiribati 6/ Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana de




Source: World Bank Global Development Finance (GDF), 2001.
1/  A group of 149 countries covered by the GDF.  Of these, 137 report to the World Bank Debtor Reporting System (DRS). 
2/  A group of 64 countries for which 1999 GNP per capita was no more than $755, as calculated by the World Bank. Of these, 62
report to the DRS.
3/  A group of 85 countries covered by the GDF for which 1999 GNP per capita was between $756 and $9,265, as calculated by
the World Bank.  Seventy-five of these countries report to the DRS.
4/  Classified by GDF as middle-income country.
5/  Decision point reached under original HIPC framework.  Case will be reassessed under the enhanced framework.
6/  Country does not report to the DRS.  - 8 - 
Scaling debt stocks against exports or GNP also shows a large buildup of burdens in LICs 
and HIPCs from 1980 to the early1990s, and a modest decline since then (Figure 2). It also 
shows that the debt burdens of the HIPCs are much higher than, in fact a multiple of, the debt 
levels of LICs or all developing countries. Interestingly, the debt-to-GNP ratio of all 
developing countries has continuously risen from some 20 percent in 1981 to over 40 percent 
in 1999; LIC debt levels have risen slightly faster (possibly reflecting lower GNP growth), 
and stood at about 60 percent of GNP in 1999; this  compares to a debt/GNP level of 
110 percent for HIPCs.  
 
Relative to exports, debt burdens of all developing countries and LICs peaked in the 
mid-1980s, then stagnated or declined. The build-up continued in HIPCs until the mid-1990s, 
in part reflecting the unsuccessful export performance of HIPCs that has led to a decline in 
HIPCs’ share in world trade from 2.2 percent in 1970 to 0.7 percent in 1997. 
 
The increase in LICs’ debt levels over time reflected both a willingness on the part of debtors 
to take on more debt, and on the part of creditors to take substantial lending risks in order to 
help poor countries, while in the case of official bilateral creditors promoting their own 
exports. It also reflected factors such as terms-of-trade shocks, a lack of sustained 
macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform, weak debt management practices, 
governance problems and other political factors, civil war and social strife.
3 
 
B.   Evolution of Various Debt Reduction Mechanisms 
 
Debt relief in the form of a restructuring or rescheduling of debt has been provided by 
creditors to debtors for a long time. The motivation is mainly to help the debtor over a period 
of payment difficulties, and to increase the creditor’s perceived likelihood of collecting on 
claims held. In cases where the debtor is a government, creditors have fewer tools available 
to enforce payments than in the case of non-sovereign debtors where foreclosure and 
bankruptcy are options. Also, where several players are involved, debtors and creditors have 
often found it convenient for both sides to reschedule debt in a concerted framework. The 
Paris Club has provided such a framework for sovereign debt reschedulings (of government-
to-government debt) mainly with OECD creditor governments since the mid-1950s.
4 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of the factors leading to high indebtedness in a sample of ten low-income 
countries, see Brooks, Cortes, Fornasi, Ketchekmen, Metzgen, Powell, Rizavi, D. Ross and 
K. Ross, “External Debt History of ten Low-income Developing Countries: Lessons from 
Their Experience”, IMF Working Paper, WP/98/72 (1998). 
4 The Paris Club requires rescheduling countries to seek similar (“comparable”) treatment 
from its other creditors. Only multilateral creditors are exempted as preferred creditors due to 
their cooperative character. For information about the Paris Club, see its website at 
www.clubdeparis.org. - 9 -
Figure 2: External Debt in Selected Country Groups, in 1981 - 1999
(In percent of  exports of goods and services, and gross national product)
Source: World Bank Global Development Finance, 2001.
1/   HIPCs which have reached the Decision Point under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative by July 2001.
2/  A group of 64 countries for which 1999 GNP per capita was no more than $755 as calculated by the World Bank. Of these, 62 report to the DRS.
















































In percent of gross national product  - 10 - 
Such Paris Club reschedulings involved mainly cash-flow relief until 1988. The debt 
servicing problems of middle-income countries, for example in Latin America in the 1980s, 
were seen as liquidity problems and were largely remedied by streching out payments to 
official bilateral creditors over time. Commercial creditors also provided cash-flow relief, but 
often in combination with a degree of debt reduction, e.g., through an exchange of claims for 
Brady bonds that provided some collateral. Table 2 shows that as of mid-2001 most 
middle-income countries have exited from the Paris Club rescheduling process.  
 
In contrast to middle-income countries, it became increasingly clear that the mounting debt 
burdens of low-income countries reflected deeper problems—they were solvency problems 
that required not only a temporary reduction in debt service, but also a reduction in the level 
of debt. Paris Club creditors began to grant such debt reduction in the form of concessional 
flow reschedulings
5 for low-income countries in late 1988 under the so-called “Toronto 
Terms” that involved a debt reduction of about one-third of the eligible amounts.
6 The level 
of debt forgiveness was subsequently raised in steps: to London terms in late 1991 
(50 percent debt reduction), and to Naples terms (two-thirds debt reduction) at the end of 
1994 (Tables 3-4). This resulted in increasingly longer and lower payment profiles on 
restructured debt (Figure 3).
7  
 
Bilateral creditors not participating in the Paris Club—mainly oil exporters in the 
Middle East, but also China, Taiwan and a number of other developing countries, including 
some HIPCs—provided more limited debt restructurings than other creditors, but in turn 
often saw their claims increasingly falling into arrears.  
                                                 
5 A flow rescheduling restructures typically debt service due during 1–3 years. Paris Club 
creditors provided restructurings of the stock of a country’s debt only since the adoption of 
Naples terms; this was seen as an exit treatment for countries with good economic policies. 
6 The reduction factor applies to pre-cutoff date non-ODA debt in NPV terms. ODA debt is 
restructured at an interest rate no higher than the original rate over 40 years, including 
16 years’ grace, which typically also implies an NPV reduction. Post-cutoff date debt is not 
subject to traditional relief mechanisms, but is taken into account under the HIPC Initiative. 
The cutoff date is set in the context of a country’s first Paris Club rescheduling in order to 
protect new lending by Paris Club creditors. 
7 For a discussion of the motivations underlying traditional debt relief and the evolution of 
Paris Club terms see Daseking and Powell, “From Toronto Terms to the HIPC Initiative: A 
Brief History of Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries”, International Economic Policy 
Review, Vol. 2, 2000, IMF, pp. 39–58. - 11 -
Low-Income 1/ Lower-Middle-Income 2/ Other Middle-Income Total
Countries that graduated from reschedulings 3/
** Albania 6/00 8/ Dominican Republic 12/99 Algeria 5/98
**** Bolivia 7/01 Ecuador 4/01 Argentina 3/95
** Bosnia/Herzegovina 4/00 Egypt 5/91 Bulgaria 4/95
*E quatorial Guinea 2/96 El Salvador 9/91 Brazil 8/93
** Cambodia 6/97 Gabon 12/00 4/ Chile 12/88
** Haiti 3/96 Guatemala 3/93 Costa Rica 6/93 4/
**** Uganda 9/00 Jamaica 9/95 4/ 6/ Croatia 12/95
* Vietnam 12/93 4/ Kenya 6/01 6/ Macedonia, FYR 3/00 8/
*** Yemen, Republic of 6/01 Morocco 12/92 Mexico 5/92
Peru 12/98 7/ Panama 3/92
Philippines 7/94 9/ Romania 12/83
Poland 4/91 Russian Federation 12/00
Trinidad and Tobago 3/91
Turkey 6/83
Number of countries 9 12 14 35
Countries with rescheduling agreements in effect
**** Benin 12/01 Djibouti 6/02
**** Burkina Faso 12/01 Georgia 12/02
**** Cameroon 12/03 Indonesia 3/02
**** Chad 3/03 Jordan 4/02
**** Ethopia 3/04 Pakistan 9/01
**** Guinea 4/04 Ukraine 9/02
**** Guinea-Bissau 12/03





*** Mozambique 12/01 8/
**** Niger 12/03
**** Rwanda 12/01




Number of countries 19 6 0 25
Countries with previous rescheduling agreements, but without current
rescheduling agreements, which have not graduated from reschedulings
Angola 9/90 Ghana 4/96 4/5/ Yugoslavia, FR 10/ 6/89
** Central African Republic, The 6/01 Nigeria 1/01
*** Côte d'Ivoire 3/01
** Congo,  Republic of 6/99




** Nicaragua 2/01 8/




Number of countries 13 2 1 16
All countries 41 20 15 76
Sources:  Paris Club Secretariat; and Fund staff estimates.
Note:    Stock treatment underlined. Dates refer to end of current or last consolidation period.  In the case of a stock-of-debt operation, canceled
agreements, or rescheduling of arrears only, date shown is that of relevant agreement.
1/ * denotes rescheduling on London terms,  ** denotes rescheduling on Naples terms, *** denotes rescheduling on Lyon terms, and **** denotes
rescheduling on Cologne terms. 
2/ Defined here as countries that obtained lower-middle-income but not concessional terms with Paris Club reschedulings.
3/ For some countries, this inevitably represents an element of judgment: in certain circumstances, for example, if hit by an external shock, a
country may need further reschedulings. 
4/ Rescheduling of arrears only.
5/ Limited deferral of long-standing arrears to three creditors on nonconcessional terms.
6/ Nonconcessional rescheduling at the authorities' request.
7/ Agreement includes a reprofiling of the stock of certain debts at the end of the consolidation period.
8/ Including deferral of maturities.
9/ The 1994 rescheduling agreement was canceled at the authorities' request.
10/ Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
11/ Last rescheduling on Toronto terms.
Table 2.  Status of Paris Club Rescheduling Countries as of End-July 2001Table 3.  Evolution of Paris Club Rescheduling Terms
Lower-Middle Low-Income Countries 2/
Income Naples Terms Options 4/
Middle- Countries Toronto Terms London Terms 3/ DSR Lyon Terms 5/  Cologne Terms
Income (Houston Options Options  Maturing Options Options 5/ 6/
Countries 1/ terms) 1/ DR DSR LM DR DSR CMI LM DR  Flows Stocks CMI LM DR DSR CMI LM DR
Since
Implemented ... Sept. 1990 Oct. 1988-June 1991 Dec. 1991-Dec. 1994 Since January 1995 Dec. 1996 - Oct. 1999 Since Nov. 1999
Grace (in years) 5-6 1/ Up to 8 1/ 8 8 14 6 -- 5 16  7/ 6 -- 3 8 20 6 8 8 20 6
Maturity (in years) 9 1/ 15 1/ 14 14 25 23 23 23 25 23 33 33 33 40 23 40 40 40 23
Repayment schedule Flat/ Flat/ - - - - - - Flat - - - - - -   - - - -  Graduated  - - - - - -   - - - - - - - -  Graduated  - - - - - - - - - - - - -  Graduated  - - - - - -  - - -  Graduated  - - -
graduated graduated
Interest rate 8/ MM M R M M R R M M R R R M M R R M M
9/  10/ 10/  11/ 1 1 / 1 1 / 1 2 / 1 2 /
Reduction  in net




  Grace (in years) 5-6 Up to 10 14 14 14 12 12 12 16 16 16 16 16 20 16 16 16 20 16








1/ Since the 1992 agreements with Argentina and Brazil, creditors have made increasing use of on pre-cutoff date commercial (non-ODA) debt, or more if this is required in the context of proportional
graduated payments schedules (up to 15 years' maturity and 2-3 years' grace for middle-income burden sharing with other creditors to achieve debt sustainability in the debtor country. All creditors will
countries; up to 18 years' maturity for lower middle-income countries). seek to apply the DR option, but if that is not possible there is also a DSR option with very long maturities
2/ DR refers to the debt-reduction option; DRS to the debt-service-reduction option; CMI and grace periods.
denotes the capitalization of moratorium interest; LM denotes the nonconcessional option 7/ Fourteen years before June 1992.
providing longer maturities.  Under London, Naples, Lyon and Cologne terms, there is a 8/ Interest rates are determined in the bilateral agreements implementing the Paris Club Agreed Minute.
provision for a stock-of-debt operation, but no such operation took place under London terms. M = market rates; R= reduced rates.
3/These have also been called "Enhanced Toronto" and "Enhanced Concessions" terms. 9/ The interest rate was 3.5 percentage points below the market rate or half of the market rate if the
4/ Until November 1999 included an option of a 50 percent level of concessionality for countries market rate was below 7 percent.
with a per capita income of more than $500, and an overall net present value of debt/export ratio  10/ Reduced to achieve a 50 percent net present value reduction.
of less than 350 percent. For a 50 percent level of concessionality, terms were equal to London 11/ Reduced to achieve a 67 percent net present value reduction; under the DSR option for the stock
terms except for the debt-service-reduction option under a stock-of-debt operation that included  operation, the interest rate is slightly higher, reflecting the three-year grace period.
a three-year grace period. 12/ Reduced to achieve an 80 percent net present value reduction.
5/ These terms are to be granted in the context of concerted action by all creditors under the HIPC 13/ The reduction of net present value depends on the reduction in interest rates and therefore varies. See
Initiative. They also include, on a voluntary basis, an ODA debt-reduction option. Footnote 9.
6/ Creditors agree on a case-by-case basis on a net present value debt reduction of  90 percent- 13 -
Table 4.  HIPCs: Paris Club Reschedulings By Type of Terms, 1976 - July 2001
Amounts consolidated
o/w stock
Number of  Number of  Total operations Stock or flow
reschedulings countries (millions of U.S. dollars) reschedulings
Nonconcessional Before October 1988 87 28 23,269           -                 flow deals only
Toronto terms October 1988 - June 1991 27 19 5,984             -                 flow deals only
London terms December 1991 - December 1994 24 22 8,774             -                 flow deals only
Naples terms Since January 1995 38 26 17,519           3,100             8 stock deals
Lyon/Cologne terms Since December 1996 21 18 8,521             3,639             6 stock deals
Sources: Paris Club Secretariat, and IMF staff estimates.- 14 -
Figure 3.  Evolution of Paris Club Low-Income Rescheduling Profiles 1/
(In percent of amounts consolidated)
Sources:  Paris Club Secretariat; and IMF staff estimates.
1/  Assuming a market interest rate of 8 percent. The payments profiles reflect the actual distribution of the debt reduction option
(DR), debt service reduction option (DSR), the capitaliztion of moratorium interest option (CMI), or the long maturities option (LM). 
2/  Assuming equal principal repayments over 10 years including 5 years of grace.
3/  Equal distribution among the options (DR, DSR, and LM).
4/  Distribution (in percent) of DR 40; DSR 45; CMI 10; LM 5.
5/  80 percent reduction in NPV terms provided in the context of the original HIPC Initiative.  Distribution (in percent) of DR 50; DSR 50.  
6/  67 percent reduction in NPV terms.  Distribution among options (in percent): DR 45; DSR 45; CMI 10.  The LM option is not
included, given that any creditor choosing this option undertakes best efforts to change to a concessional option at a later date when
feasible.
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Paris Club reschedulings were complemented by initiatives to forgive bilateral ODA claims, 
going back as far as a resolution adopted in 1978 by the Trade Development Board (TDB) of 
the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Also, donor governments gave 
some debt reduction through debt swaps,
8 and began to provide more and more of bilateral 
development assistance in the form of grants.
9  
 
HIPCs have experienced a withdrawal of private creditors over the years. Similar to 
non-Paris Club official bilateral creditors, these claims are often not serviced. IDA facilitated 
buybacks of about US$7 billion in commercial debt of low-income countries at steep 
discounts with the help of grants from bilateral donors (Table 5). 
 
These “traditional debt relief mechanisms” reduced bilateral and commercial debt, but not 
debt to multilateral organizations. As multilateral institutions continued to provide support to 
low-income countries’ policy adjustment efforts through (mostly concessional) loans—in the 
absence of significant grant resources—they accounted for an increasing share of new loan 
resources to low-income countries, which was reflected in an increasing share of multilateral 
debt in the total debt of low-income countries. To mitigate this, a number of bilateral 
creditors began to provide grants to help service multilateral debts of some HIPCs, 
e.g., Uganda. 
 
In the 1990s calls from various quarters, including NGOs, sought a broader approach to 
reducing the debt burden of low-income countries. These efforts culminated in the adoption 
of the HIPC Initiative in the fall of 1996 and its enhancement three years later in 1999 by the 
membership of the IMF and World Bank.
10 At the same time as the implementation of the 
HIPC Initiative is moving ahead, a number of industrial countries have committed to go 
beyond it and forgive all or part of the remaining claims (Table 6). 
                                                 
8 For information on debt swaps, see Appendix VI in: Ross, Harmsen, et al., Official 
Financing for Developing Countries, World Economic and Financial Surveys, IMF, 2001. 
9 Some OECD DAC members no longer provide ODA in the form of loans: Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See OECD, “Debt and 
Development Co-operation: Debt Relief Actions by DAC Members”, OCDE/GD(97)134, 
1997. 
10 For policy and country documents and general information on the HIPC Initiative, see 




Completed       Country Per dollar 1/  
   
March 1991 Niger 207 18 99 19.37 8.42
December 1991 Mozambique 198 10 64 13.41 5.91
November 1992 Guyana 93 14 100 10.23 10.00
February 1993 Uganda 177 12 89 22.58 10.21
May 1993 Bolivia 170 16 94 27.26 9.81
August 1994 Sao Tome & Principe 10 10 87 1.27 1.27
September 1994 Zambia 408 11 78 24.99 11.76
September 1995 Sierra Leone 3/ 286 13 73 31.53 21.00
December 1995 Nicaragua 1,819 8 81 89.20 40.75
January 1996 Ethiopia 284 8 80 18.83 6.18
August 1996 Mauritania 89 10 98 5.82 3.18
December 1996 Senegal 4/ 112 20 96 15.00 7.46
December 1997 Togo 74 13 99 6.11 5.11
March 1998 Côte d'Ivoire 5/ 2,027 24 100 173.90 20.00
March 1999 Guinea 61 13 75 8.67 5.59
August 1999 Guyana II 34 9 62 3.36 1.20
March 2001 Yemen 675 4 92 15.20 7.50
Total 6,724.74 13.9  6/ 86.29 486.73 175.35  
Source: IDA.
1/  Of original face value of principal.
2/  Represent resources for IBRD, donors and contributions from certain recipient countries.  These figures also include US$15 million
for technical assistance grants and closing costs, and other related expenses.
3/   Two tier operation.  Commercial debt was bought back at 15 cents and suppliers credit at 8 cents.
4/  16 cents for the cash buy-back and 20 cents for long terms exchange bonds.
5/  The numbers relate only to the cash buy-back component of the total debt under the operation since the Facility financed
exclusively the cash buy-back option, as approved by the Executive Directors (Report No. P-7151-IVC).  Other resources for the
operation included IDA credits, French concessional financing, IMF credits and co-financing from the government of  Côte d’Ivoire.
6/  Weighted average.
Table 5. IDA Debt Buybacks: Summary of Completed Operations for HIPCs, 1991 to 2001
(End-March 2001)
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
and Interest Debt Resources Resources 
Extinguished Extinguished Utilized Utilized
Principal Percent Eligible Total  2/ IBRD Table 6.  Paris Club Creditors' Delivery of Debt Relief Under Bilateral Initiatives
Beyond the HIPC Initiative (August 1, 2001)
Countries covered ODA (in percent) Non-ODA (in percent) Provision of relief
Pre-COD Post-COD Pre-COD Post-COD Decision point Completion
(In percent) point
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Australia HIPCs 100 100 100 100 1/ 1/ 1/
Austria HIPCs (case-by-case) Case-by-case (100) Case-by-case (100) Case-by-case (100) - Case-by-case Case-by-case
Belgium HIPCs 100 100 Case-by-case (up to 100) Case-by-case flow Stock
Canada HIPCs 2/ - 3/ - 3/ 100 100 100 flow Stock
Denmark HIPCs 100 Case-by-case - - - Stock
France HIPCs 100 100 100 - 100 flow 4/ Stock
Finland HIPCs 95 98 - - - -
Germany HIPCs 100 100 100 - 100 flow Stock
Ireland - - - - - - -
Italy HIPCs 100 100 100 100 100 flow Stock
Japan HIPCs 100 100 100 - - Stock
Netherlands HIPCs 100 100 100 - 90-100 flow 5/ Stock 5/
Norway HIPCs - 3/ - 3/ 100 100 6/ 100 flow Stock
Russia Case-by-case - - - - - Stock
Spain HIPCs 100 Case-by-case Case-by-case Case-by-case - Stock
Sweden Case-by-case - 3/ - 3/ Case-by-case (100) - - Stock
Switzerland HIPCs - 3/ - 3/ Case-by-case Case-by-case Case-by-case, flow Stock
United Kingdom HIPCs 100 100 100 100 7/ 100 flow 7/ Stock
United States HIPCs 100 100 100 100 8/ 100 flow Stock
-




1/ Australia: (a) post-COD non-ODA relief to apply to debts incurred before a date to be finalized; (b) timing details for both flow and stock relief are to be finalized.
2/ Canada: including Bangladesh.  Canada has granted a moratorium of debt service as of January 2001 on all debt disbursed before end-March 1999 for 11 out
of 17 HIPCs with debt service due to Canada.  The debt will be written off at the completion point. The countries to be covered are: Benin, Bolivia, Cameroon,
Ethiopia, Guyana, Honduras, Madagascar, Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia.
3/  100 percent of ODA claims have already been cancelled on HIPCs, with the exception of Myanmar's debt to Canada.
4/  France: cancellation of 100 percent of debt service on pre-cutoff date commercial claims as they fall due starting at the decision point.  Once countries
have reached their completion debt relief on ODA claims will go to a special account and will be used for specific development projects.
5/  The Netherlands: (a) ODA: 100 percent ODA: pre- and post-cutoff date debt will be cancelled at decision point; (b) non-ODA: in some particular cases (Bolivia, 
Burkina Faso, Mali, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Tanzania), the Netherlands will write off 100 percent of the consolidated amounts on the flow at decision point; all
other HIPCs will receive interim relief up to 90 percent reduction of the consolidated amounts.  At completion point, all HIPC countries will receive 100 percent
cancellation of the remaining stock of the pre-COD debt.
6/  On debt assumed before December 31, 1997.
7/  United Kingdom: "beyond 100%": full write-off of all debts of HIPCs as of their decision points, and reimbursement at the decision point of any debt service
paid before the decision point.
8/ United States: 100 percent post-COD non-ODA treated on debt assumed prior to 06/20/99 (the Cologne Summmit).
Note: Columns (1) to (7) describe the additional debt relief provided following a specific methodology under bilateral initiatives and need to be read as a whole for
each creditor.  In column (1), "HIPCs" stands for eligible countries effectively qualifying for the HIPC process.  A "100 percent" mention in the table means that the
debt relief provided under the enhanced HIPC framework will be topped up to 100 percent through a bilateral initiative.  - 18 - 
 
 
C.   Relative Impact of Various Debt Reduction Mechanisms 
 
What is the relative size of these various debt reduction mechanisms? Only rough estimates 
are available for the various elements of historical debt relief. As relief has been provided in 
a number of steps over time, comparing such estimates in present value terms at a given point 
in time necessarily involves large margins of uncertainty, but orders of magnitude still give a 
useful perspective.  
 
Estimates of debt reduction in the context of the HIPC Initiative are based on existing debt 
stocks, i.e., after any debt reduction provided in the past. They then simulate the full use of 
traditional debt relief (stock-of-debt operation on Naples terms), and derive the further debt 
stock reduction that would be achieved by HIPC relief and additional bilateral debt 
forgiveness. For the 23 decision point HIPCs, total debt reduction is estimated at about 
two-thirds from existing debt stocks (Figure 4a). 
 
A more comprehensive perspective would also include the impact of debt reduction already 
provided in the past. Daseking and Powell
11 derived estimates of the impact of traditional 
debt relief mechanisms based on Paris Club information, and World Bank data (GDF; see 
Table 7). Combining this with other estimates of the Paris Club Secretariat and of IMF and 
World Bank staff in the context of the HIPC Initiative (Table 8), yields an overall debt 
reduction by some 80 percent over time for the 37 countries that are expected to require 
HIPC relief (Figure 4b).
12  
 
Traditional debt relief already provided to the 37 HIPCs over the 1988–99 period has been 
estimated at about US$60–65 billion (in 1999 NPV terms). Additional traditional relief yet to 
be granted in the context of the HIPC Initiative (US$36 billion) would bring the total 
traditional relief to about US$100 billion. This compares with US$39 billion of HIPC debt 
relief, and US$9 billion expected from additional bilateral debt forgiveness.  
                                                 
11 See Footnote 6. 
12 Note that an element of measurement difficulties is reflected in the evaluation of the 
Russian debt relief efforts. Russia joined the Paris Club as a creditor in September 1997, and 
has reached agreements with most rescheduling countries on the same terms as those 
provided earlier by other Paris Club creditors, but has agreed with the Club that it would 
provide an up-front discount of 70–80 percent for low-income countries before the 
application of Paris Club terms largely reflecting valuation problems related to Soviet ruble- 
or Transferable ruble-denominated claims (largely of FSU origin). As Russian claims on 
developing countries were sizeable (partly reflecting the valuation of ruble-denominated 
claims), this accounts for a large share of the debt stocks and estimates of traditional debt 
relief. Figure 4: Reduction of Debt Stocks for HIPCs, as of July 2001
(US$, billion, in decision point terms) Cumulative Reduction of the NPV (Percent change)
a. 23 HIPCs that Reached their Decision Points by July 2001 in Current Perspective (in decision point NPV terms) 
b. 37 HIPCs Expected to Require HIPC Relief in Historical Perspective (in 1999 NPV terms)
- 19 -
Sources: HIPC Documents and Table 8.
1/ Traditional debt relief not yet provided as of decision point.













































































82%Estimated Actual Debt Relief Hypothetical Debt Relief
PV of debt PV of debt PV of debt NPV of debt
Creditor Coverage reduction  Coverage reduction  Coverage  reduction  1/ Coverage  reduction 
1988-98 1988-99
Paris Club reschedulings (excluding Russia) yes ... yes 23 yes ... yes 43
Russia-based on official exchange rate yes ... yes 34 yes ... yes 40
   up-front discount ... ... yes 26 yes ... yes 30
   after up front discount  ... ... yes 8 yes ... yes 10
Total Paris Club (including Russia) yes ... yes 57 yes ... yes 83
OECD bilateral ODA forgiveness yes, up to  ... no  - yes, up to  yes 15-20
1996 1996
Non-Paris Club bilateral creditors yes ... no  - yes ... yes 13-16
   IDA Debt Reduction Facility yes ... yes 5 yes ... yes 13
Total PV of debt reduction
      excluding Russian claims n/a 28 n/a 83-92
      after up-front discount on Russian claims n/a 36 n/a 93-102
      including up-front discount on Russian claims 79 62 111 123-132
Sources: Agreed Minutes of Paris Club debt reschedulings; Paris Club Secretariat; World Bank Global Development Finance (GDF); and IMF staff estimates.  







Table 7.  Summary of Debt Relief Under Traditional Mechanisms for 41 HIPCs
(In billions of end-1999 U.S. dollars)
GDF data 1/ Paris Club data 1/ GDF data 1/ Paris Club data & staff est.Table 8. Tentative Estimates of Overall Debt Relief
(In billions of U.S. dollars)
Historical Debt Relief  Debt stocks 1/ Future Debt Relief  Total 
1999 NPV terms 1999 NPV terms Nominal terms 1999 NPV terms Debt Relief











1. Countries that have reached the 
decision point (23 countries)
…                        54                        75                    10                   20                    4                 34  …
2. Countries that have not reached the 
decision point (14 countries)
…                        63                        50                    28                   20                    5                 52  …
Total (1+2) (37 countries) 58-67                       117                      145                    36                   39                    9                 85  143-152
3. Countries not expected to require 
HIPC relief (4 countries)
                                     20                         39                        45                      9    --    --                   9  29
Total (41 countries) 78-87                       155                      190                    46                   39                    9                 94  172-181
Sources: Table 4; HIPC country documents; Global Development Finance 2001; and IMF and World Bank staff estimates.
1/ Data from HIPC documents (group 1) or GDF (group 2). Debt relief figures for group 2 are estimates. Data for Chad, and Ghana are in 2000 terms. Data for Benin, 
Bolivia, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Mozambique, and Senegal and in 1998 terms. GDF data, which are for 1999, rely on country reporting and are not as comprehensive as the 
data used under the HIPC Initiative. Calculations of the NPV of debt in the GDF are based on a common (10 percent) discount rate, a methodology which differs from the
currency-specific discount rates (or Commercial Interest Reference Rates) used in DSAs for the HIPC documents.
2/ Refers to debt relief pledged by individual bilateral creditors over and beyond HIPC debt relief.
3/ Includes Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Republic of Congo, Myanmar, Sierra Leone and Togo.
4/ Includes Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan.
- 21 -  - 22 - 
 
The impact of the various debt relief initiatives varies among recipient countries depending 
on the structure and creditor composition of their debt. The debt reduction factors under the 
HIPC Initiative, for example, vary between less than 20 percent for Honduras and Senegal, 
and over 80 percent for Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe (Figure 5). 
 
Debt relief will leave HIPCs with debt levels comparable to those of other developing 
countries, and much lower debt service obligations. The existing debt stocks of the 
23 decision point HIPCs after the delivery of committed debt relief are projected to be 
reduced by two-thirds. Compared to all non-HIPC developing countries, this is similar in 
terms of exports at under 130 percent, but these HIPCs’ debt levels will be much lower 
relative to GDP (29 of GDP for the 23 HIPCs against 36 percent of GNP for other 
developing countries; Table 9). At the same time, debt service obligations of these 23 HIPCs 
will fall to less than half the average of other developing countries, as discussed below. 
 
 
III.   HIPC RELIEF IMPACT AND RESOURCE FLOWS TO HIPCS 
 
Absolute debt service payments by developing countries and LICs rose by three and a half 
times during the 1980s and 1990s despite debt relief efforts (Figure 6). Debt service 
payments for all developing countries increased from about US$110 billion in 1981 to 
US$390 billion in 1999, and for LICs from US$14 billion to US$47 billion. Growth of debt 
service payments by HIPCs was less pronounced but still significant; for all 41 HIPCs, debt 
service paid was about US$6 billion in the early 80s and peaked at US$10 billion in 1995, 
reflecting an arrears clearance operation for Zambia, then stabilized at just under 
US$10 billion. Debt service payments by the group of 23 decision point HIPCs exhibited a 
similar evolution: they rose from around US$3 in 1981 to a (Zambia-induced) peak of 
US$6 billion in 1995, and then stablized at about US$3½ billion.  
 
As a proportion of export earnings, debt service payments for the various country groups 
averaged 15–25 percent in the early 80s, then rose to 25–30 percent by the mid-80s, before 
gradually getting back to 15–20 percent by the end of the 1990s. The ratio for HIPCs was 
higher than that for all developing countries until the mid-90s, when other developing 
countries experienced a sharp increase in the debt service ratio to over 20 percent, reflecting 
the increase in spreads paid by emerging market countries after the Asian crisis, and the loan 
support extended to overcome the crisis. Since the mid-1980s, the HIPCs’ ratio of debt 
service to exports was consistently below the ratio for LICs. The debt service ratio for the 
23 decision point HIPCs was higher than that for other HIPCs or LICs, reflecting the fact that 
they generally serviced their debts—sometimes with the help of donor grants, e.g., for 
multilateral debt service—while several other HIPCs accummulated arrears and made only 
small debt service payments. 
 
By the end of the 1990s, the group of 23 HIPCs had a total debt service ratio of slightly under 
20 percent of exports, based on GDF data. The data reported in HIPC Initiative country 
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Figure 5.  Enhanced HIPC Initiative
Comparative Debt Reduction and Debt Relief for 23 Decision Point Countries
Status as of end July 2001
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Debt Reduction (In percent)
Note:   --  Debt reduction is measured by the common reduction factor.  This refers to the percentage by which each 
creditor needs to reduce its debt stock at the decision point so as to enable the country to reach its debt sustainability 
target.  The calculation is based in net present (NPV) information.
            --  For Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Guyana, Mali, Mozambique and Uganda assistance under the original and 
enhanced frameworks is combined.
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Figure 6: Total Debt Service Paid by Selected Country Groups; 1981 - 1999 1/
(In billion of U.S. dollars, and percent of exports of goods and services)
Source: World Bank Global Development Finance of 2001.
1/  Principal and interest payments on total long-terms debt (public and publicly guaranteed and private
non-guaranteed), including IMF credit, and interest on short-term debt.
2/  A group of 149 countries covered by the GDF.  Of these, 137 report to the DRS, while World Bank estimates are
used for the others.
3/  A group of 64 countries for which 1999 GNP per capita was no more than $755 as calculated by the World Bank.
Of these, 62 report to the DRS.
4/  HIPCs which have already reached the Decision Point under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative by July 2001.
*  Note: The peaks reflect arrears clearance operations in 1991 for Nicaragua with the IaDB
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that debt service paid by private entities in HIPCs (without a HIPC government guarantee) is 
not included in the HIPC Initiative calculations, and also the netting out of debt service 
grants against gross payments in the HIPC data, while GDF reports gross debt service paid. 
As recorded in the HIPC Initiative country documents, HIPC relief is projected to reduce the 
debt service ratio from 16 percent of export in 1998–99 to 8 percent 2001–05 (Tables 9–10 
and Figure 7). Absolute debt service payments for these 23 countries averaged 
US$2.8 billion during 1998–99, and will be reduced by about one-third to an average of 
US$2 billion in 2001–05.
13 Compared to payments that would be due during 2001–2005 in 
the absence of enhanced HIPC relief, the decline is about one-half. This holds in absolute 
terms as well as relative to exports, government revenue, or GDP (Table 10).  
 
HIPC relief is substantial relative to pre-HIPC debt service and—as we shall discuss in the 
next Section—provides a strong basis for debt sustainability. Yet its magnitude is modest 
when viewed in a broader context, e.g., compared to net external resource flows to these 
countries.  Historical net resource flows to the public sector of the 23 HIPCs, including 
grants and technical cooperation, have been sizeable—they averaged US$5.9 billion annually 
during the 1980s (12.6 percent of GNP) and increased to US$8.8 billion (13.7 percent of 
GNP) during the 1990s (Figure 8). Annual savings from HIPC relief, in contrast, are 
estimated at about US$1 billion or 1½ percent of GDP for the period 2001–2005 compared to 
debt service payments in 1998–99 (Table 10). At the same time, spending on health and 
education is projected to rise by over 40 percent, or $1.7 billion per year (Figure 7) between 
1999 and 2002; in terms of GDP, social spending is to rise from 5.5 percent of GDP to 
7 percent. This exceeds health and education spending for low-income countries (of 
4½ percent of GDP) and almost reaches middle-income country levels (7.3 percent of GNP) 
of 1997 (Table 11). However, as these countries’ social indicators suggest, it still falls short 
of needs. 
 
Future resource requirements of HIPCs will remain high. The medium-term projections 
presented in the HIPC documents for the 23 decision point HIPCs showed net flows derived 
from balance of payments data; these data reflect grants more partially than the GDF data 
and generally do not include technical cooperation grants that are provided in kind, and are 
thus much lower than GDF data.
14 Based on such balance of payments data, net flows 
amounted to US$4.3 billion in the 1990s, and are projected to increase to US$6.7 billion in 
the next 10 years; with GDP projected to rise, in relative terms net flows are projected to 
decline slightly from 6.7 percent of recipient GDP to 6.0 percent (Table 12). The grant 
element of the debt of these 23 HIPCs, which was less than 30 percent for debt outstanding at  
                                                 
13 This reflects payments in 1998-99 after delivery of relief to Bolivia, Guyana, Mozambique, 
and Uganda under the original HIPC Initiative framework. Before any such relief, debt 
service payments would have averaged US$3.1 billion. 
14 GDF data for the 23 decision point HIPCs show average annual grants of US$5.5 billion or 
8.5 percent of GNP in the 1990s, and technical cooperation grants of US$2.2 billion or 
3.4 percent of GNP. - 26 -
Table 9.  Debt Indicators in Developing Countries and HIPCs, 1999 1/ 2/
(In percent)
Developing Non-HIPC All HIPCs, 23 Decision Point HIPCs
country developing  before HIPC before HIPC after HIPC
average countries relief relief (1999) relief (2003)
NPV of debt-to-exports ratio 133 128 249 259 127
NPV of debt-to-GDP ratio 38 36 84 60 29
Debt service-to-exports ratio 20 21 14 16 3/ 8 4/
Source: World Bank Global Development Finance, and HIPC documents.
1/  Excludes Liberia and Somalia due to incomplete data.
2/  Weighted averages; 1999 figures for the first 3 columns based on Global Development Finance data.
3/  Average for 1998-99 based on debt service paid.
4/  Average for 2001-2003.- 27 -
After After Additional
Traditional After HIPC Bilateral Debt Percent
Debt Relief  Assistance Forgiveness Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) = (2 vs. 1)
Debt Stock  (as of 1999, assuming that debt relief
    is provided unconditionally at the decision points)
      NPV Debt (in billions of U.S. dollars) 45 25 21 -44
      NPV Debt/Exports (in percent) (19 countries) 2/ 290 150 126 -48
      NPV Debt/Revenues  (in percent) (4 countries) 3/ 278 250 164 -10
      NPV Debt/GDP  (in percent)  60 33 27 -44
Debt Service (in billions of U.S. dollars)
    Average paid, 1998-99 2.8 ... ... ...
    Average due, 2001-05 4/ 3.6 2.0 ... -43
Debt Service Ratios
   Debt Service/Exports Ratio
        Average paid, 1998-99 15.8% ... ... ...
        Average due, 2001-05  4/ 14.1% 8.0% ... -43
   Debt Service/Revenues Ratio
        Average paid, 1998-99 23.3% ... ... ...
        Average due, 2001-05 4/ 20.3% 11.5% ... -43
   Debt Service/GDP Ratio
        Average paid, 1998-99 3.7% ... ... ...
        Average due, 2001-05 4/ 3.7% 2.1% ... -43
Sources: HIPC decision point documents; and IMF and World Bank staff estimates.
1/  Impact shown for those 23 countries that have reached their enhanced decision points by July 2001. All ratios are weighted
averages. 
2/  Assistance granted based on the NPV to exports target: Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Tanzania, Uganda,
and Zambia.
3/  Fiscal window cases: Guyana, Honduras, Mauritania, and Senegal.
4/ Debt service for 2000 is not included because many countries reached their enhanced decision point only in December 2000,
or later. For Bolivia and Uganda the "Before HIPC Assistance" figures are after delivery of original HIPC relief.
Table 10.  Impact of Debt Relief for the 23 HIPCs that Have Reached an Enhanced Decision Point 1/- 28 -
Figure 7: 23 HIPCs: Debt Service and Social Spending after HIPC Relief, 1998 - 2005 1/
Debt-service to exports Debt-service to government revenues
Debt-service Social spending
Source: HIPC documents and staff estimates.



































Debt-service ratios after HIPC relief
(In percent)
Social Spending and debt-service due after HIPC relief
(In billion of US dollars)- 29 -
Figure 8: Net Transfers on Public Medium- and Long-term Debt, 1981 - 1999 1/
(In billions of U.S. dollars and percent of recipient's GNP)
Source: World Bank Global Development Finance of 2001.
1/  Including grants and IMF.
2/  A group of 149 countries covered by the GDF.  Of these, 137 report to the DRS, while World Bank estimates are
used for the others.
3/  A group of 64 countries for which 1999 GNP per capita was no more than $755 as calculated by the World Bank.
Of these, 62 report to the DRS.
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Table 11: Public Expenditure on Health and Education
Education
Health expenditure expenditure
(In percent of GDP) 1/ (In percent of GNI) 2/
World 2.5                           4.8                           
High-income countries 3/ 6.1                           5.4                           
Middle-income countries 4/ 2.5                           4.8                           
Low-income countries 5/ 1.2                           3.3                           
HIPCs (41) average 2.1                           3.4                           
HIPCs (23) average 6/  2.6                           2.0                           
Memorandum items:
23 Decision Point HIPCs, based on HIPC documents
  Average total social expenditure
in 1999 (estimated) 5.5
in 2002 (projected) 7.0
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database, and HIPC Initiative country documents.
1/  1997 data for world, middle-income, and  low-income countries, otherwise 1998 data.
2/  In percent of Gross National Income, 1996 data.
3/  Countries for which 1999 GNP per capita was higher than $9,265 as calculated by the World Bank.
4/  A group of 85 countries for which 1999 GNP per capita was between $756 and $9,265 as calculated
by the World Bank.
5/  A group of 64 countries for which 1999 GNP per capita was no more than $755 as calculated by
the World Bank.
6/  HIPCs which have already reached their Decision Points under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative by
July 2001.- 31 -
Table 12. HIPCs that Have Reached a Decision Point
Flows of Official External Resources
New Borrowing 1/ Grants  1/ 2/ Grant Element in Borrowing
Existing debt  New borrowing
  1990-99 2000-10 1990-99 2000-10 1990-99 2000-10 1990-99 2000-10 at end-99 2000-10
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
Benin 60.5 70.7 81.0 144.9 49.5 36.6 92.0 179.0
Bolivia 375.9 352.8 208.3 125.9 127.6 295.9 456.6 182.8
Burkina-Faso 109.9 133.5 120.5 64.5 151.5 33.8 78.9 164.2
Cameroon 174.3 410.3 57.7 43.1 409.5 344.0 -177.5 109.3
Chad 72.3 131.2 122.0 101.8 24.6 33.6 169.8 199.4
The Gambia 27.1 23.5 36.0 28.4 27.2 13.9 35.8 37.9
Guinea 169.7 197.7 130.9 111.6 176.2 99.4 124.4 210.0
Guinea-Bissau 52.5 11.3 26.9 40.9 7.6 7.1 71.8 45.0
Guyana 91.4 71.1 11.5 18.3 99.5 48.9 3.3 40.6
Honduras 306.3 442.7 183.9 173.7 394.2 239.6 95.9 376.9
Madagascar 98.3 175.6 98.8 228.7 108.2 91.9 88.9 312.4
Malawi 175.8 4/ 100.9 119.0 116.8 88.9 57.4 205.8 160.3
Mali 188.1 158.7 188.1 161.6 129.7 71.4 246.5 248.9
Mauritania 123.7 58.1 102.8 111.6 102.1 6/ 55.5 124.5 114.3
Mozambique 231.1 251.5 415.1 353.4 48.2 65.9 598.0 539.0
Nicaragua 251.5 262.7 273.9 234.9 190.7 60.5 334.6 437.0
Niger 29.5 175.2 133.5 112.4 39.1 37.9 123.9 249.7
Rwanda 68.5 4/ 437.5 252.8 4/ 111.0 5/ 22.2 6/ 15.1 299.0 533.4
São Tomé and Príncipe 19.9 10.3 17.7 16.5 1.3 2.4 36.3 24.4
Senegal 263.0 158.5 288.5 122.9 230.5 148.5 321.0 132.9
Tanzania 59.0 644.9 376.3 1016.9 135.3 7/ 170.4 299.9 1491.4
Uganda 455.1 309.5 103.8 394.2 212.0 83.3 346.9 620.3
Zambia 428.9 8/ 263.0 359.5 9/ 220.3 443.7 8/ 150.7 344.7 332.6
    Total 3,832.0 4,851.2 3,708.4 4,054.1 3,219.4 2,163.9 4,321.1 6,741.5
(In percent of GDP) (In percent)
Benin 3.1 2.0 4.0 4.0   2.4 1.1 4.7 4.8 31.8 52.8
Bolivia 5.9 3.0 3.2 1.1 1.9 2.4 7.2 1.7 22.2 10/ 26.3
Burkina_Faso 4.3 3.3 4.7 1.6 6.1 0.8 2.9 4.1 40.0 55.2
Cameroon 1.9 2.8 0.6 0.3 4.5 2.7 -2.1 0.5 15.4 41.5
Chad 4.8 5.3 8.1 4.1 1.7 1.3 11.2 8.2 44.9 11/ 60.9 12/
The Gambia 7.5 5.5 10.1 5.1 7.7 2.5 10.0 8.1 42.9 52.1
Guinea 4.9 4.7 4.0 2.8 5.3 2.6 3.6 4.9 28.4 70.3
Guinea-Bissau 21.6 3.5 10.8 10.3 3.1 1.9 29.4 11.9 25.0 53.4
Guyana 19.3 8.4 2.0 2.1 19.1 5.4 2.2 5.0 23.3 10/ 51.2
Honduras 8.3 4.3 4.7 2.2 10.2 2.8 2.9 3.7 23.1 50.7
Madagascar 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.3 1.5 2.7 5.0 32.5 51.3
Malawi 10.2 4/ 5.2 6.8 5.6 5.0 2.8 12.0 7.9 43.2 71.5
Mali 7.5 4.1 7.5 4.1 5.1 1.8 10.0 6.4 … 55.5
Mauritania 12.0 5.5 10.2 8.8 10.4 6/ 4.6 11.7 9.7 24.0 50.6
Mozambique 8.6 4.5 15.8 5.5 2.0 1.0 22.4 9.0 57.1 13/ 77.5
Nicaragua 13.4 8.6 14.8 7.7 10.2 2.0 18.0 14.3 16.0 48.6
Niger 1.5 7.2 6.5 4.0 2.0 1.5 6.0 9.7 32.5 79.5
Rwanda 3.9 4/ 15.6 18.2 4/ 5.2 5/ 1.4 6/ 0.6 20.8 20.2 44.8 67.1
São Tomé and Príncipe 40.8 12.8 38.9 26.9 2.8 4.0 76.9 35.7 35.2 70.0
Senegal 5.4 2.3 6.0 1.7 4.8 2.1 6.6 1.9 32.1 63.4
Tanzania 0.9 4.7 7.1 7.7 2.2 7/ 1.3 5.8 11.1 27.7 57.9
Uganda 12.1 3.1 2.6 4.0 5.6 0.8 9.1 6.3 10.1 69.2
Zambia 12.7 8/ 6.5 10.6 9/ 5.0 13.0 8/ 3.5 10.3 8.0 22.6 53.6
    Simple average 9.3 5.5 8.7 5.4 5.6 2.2   12.4 8.6 30.7 14/ 57.8
    Weighted average 6.0 4.3 5.7 3.6 5.0 1.9 6.7 6.0 27.8 14/ 56.7
Sources: Calculations based on Decision Point documents, WEO database and staff estimates.
Note:  These figures are based on Balance of Payments statistics reporting by the debtor countries. 
1/ Annual averages. 9/ 1990-98.
2/ Official transfers. 10/ 1998.
3/ Defined as new loans plus grants minus debt service paid. 11/ 2000.
4/ 1992-99. 12/ 2001-2010.
5/ 2000-06. 13/ After traditional relief.
6/ 1994-99. 14/ Excludes Mali.
7/ 1993-98.
8/ Reflects clearance of arrears to the IMF in 1995. Excluding this operation, the ratios
would be 8.2 and 8.4 percent for borrowing and debt service paid, respectively.
Debt Service Paid/Due 1/ Net Flows 1/ 3/  - 32 - 
 
end-1999, is projected to increase substantially to more than 55 percent for new borrowing in 
the next decade (Table 12). Such increases in the supply of resources to HIPCs and the grant 
element involved will require a substantial effort on the part of creditors and donors. 
 
Note that progress toward raising aid levels would have a much higher impact on poverty 
reduction than additonal debt relief. Net ODA disbursements averaged 0.22 percent of donor 
GNP in 2000, with G-7 donors providing a much lower share of their income as aid than 
other OECD donors (Figure 9 and Table 13). Raising this by a mere 0.1 percent of GNP—
rather than to the UN target of 0.7 percent—would provide an additional $24 billion to 
developing countries, dwarfing the annual impact that debt relief can have. 
 
NGO campaigns often contrast debt service payments with selected measures of health or 
education spending with the intention to gather support for debt cancellation. This argument 
leaves out the support provided to low-income countries by external entities, which, as the 
numbers above suggest, for years has far exceeded debt service payments. In effect, over the 
last two decades, gross resource transfers to the 23 HIPCs have been three and a half times 
the amount of debt service paid. With reduced debt service payments and higher net 
transfers, this ratio is projected to increase further during the next decade. 
 
The premise behind many NGOs’ simple message is that lower debt service payments would 
leave more resources available to HIPCs to spend on poverty reduction programs. However, 
this may not be the case. In the past a number of donors have provided grants to cover debt 
service payments due by several HIPCs, particularly debt service due to multilateral 
creditors. It remains to be seen if these grant resources will continue to be available to HIPCs 
after the HIPC Initiative has lowered the level of debt service due. Also, a number of 
creditors engaged in defensive lending, i.e., provided new loans that helped cover the debt 
service falling due on existing loans; such practices presumably would not be continued after 
debt relief—though some creditors, instead of cancelling debt, will provide grants equivalent 
to debt reduction. Thus it is not clear whether higher debt relief would increase net transfers 
to low-income countries. 
 
Higher debt relief could actually reduce net resource flows to HIPCs if a donor’s aid budget 
is fixed in nominal terms, and the donor has to fund debt stock reduction out of a given aid 
allocation at one point in time rather than streching the budgetary impact out over a number 
of years (as done, e.g., by France and Japan). In this situation, where there is a tradeoff 
between debt relief and other forms of development assistance, more debt relief would 
actually reduce the net cash resources available to recipient countries as the reduction of 
future debt service maturities is funded out of the current aid budget.
15 Also, higher debt 
                                                 
15 An interesting discussion of these issues is forthcoming by G. Bird and A. Milne, “Debt 
Relief for Poor Countries: Distinguishing Rhetoric from Reality,” mimeo, 2001. Also by 
them, “Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries: Is It Effective and Efficient,” Surrey Center 
for International Economic Studies, Working Paper (2000). 
Figure 9:  Net ODA Disbursements by G7 and Other DAC Countries, 1990-2000 1/
(Percent of GNP)
Source: OECD.


















Table 13: Net ODA Disbursements by Major DAC Countries, 1990-2000 1/
At Current Prices 2000
At Constant Change 1999/00 Share of
1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1999 Prices At Current At Constant Donor's GNP
2/ 2/ 2/ 2/ 3/ Prices 1999 Prices 2000
(Billions of U.S. dollars) (Percent)
Canada 2.5 2.1 1.8 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.4 -2.2 0.25
Denmark 1.2 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.9 -4.0 7.3 1.06
France 7.2 8.4 7.5 6.3 5.7 5.6 4.2 4.9 -25.1 -13.9 0.33
Germany 6.3 7.5 7.6 5.9 5.6 5.5 5.0 5.8 -8.7 5.9 0.27
Italy 3.4 1.6 2.4 1.3 2.3 1.8 1.4 1.5 -24.3 -14.3 0.13
Japan 9.1 14.5 9.4 9.4 10.6 15.3 13.1 12.6 -14.8 -17.9 0.27
Netherlands 2.5 3.2 3.2 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.4 -1.9 10.0 0.82
Sweden 2.0 1.7 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.0 11.2 22.3 0.81
United Kingdom 2.6 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.9 3.5 4.5 4.7 29.2 35.6 0.31
United States 11.4 7.4 9.4 6.9 8.8 9.1 9.6 9.4 4.8 2.7 0.10
G7 donors 40.9 44.7 41.3 35.1 38.6 42.6 39.4 40.6 -7.3 -4.8 0.19
Other DAC donors 4/ 12.0 14.2 14.2 13.2 13.5 13.8 13.6 15.0 -1.5 8.3 0.46
Total DAC   53.0 58.9 55.4 48.3 52.1 56.4 53.1 55.5 -5.9 -1.6 0.22
    (in percent of GNP) 0.33 0.27 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.22 ... ... ... ...
Source: OECD. 
1/  Data are based on total amounts provided by donors.  Excludes debt forgiveness of non-ODA claims.  2000 data are provisional.
2/  Not strictly comparable to earlier data due to the reclassification of some former ODA recipients to Part II of the DAC list of Aid Recipients.
3/  At 1999 prices and exchange rates.
4/  Includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland.  - 35 - 
 
relief may lead to a reallocation of aid resources toward more indebted countries, rather than 
toward those countries that merit most support based on their own efforts. 
 
Some critics have argued that debt writeoff is merely an accounting transaction. However, 
most official creditors keep claims on developing countries on their books at face value, 
i.e., they generally do not make an assessment of the residual value of a claim, in part 
because they do not intend to market the claim. Such creditors have to fund any reduction of 
a claim below its face value from current budget allocations. In order to protect the usable 
resources available to HIPCs to fund their poverty reduction strategies, the premise of the 
HIPC Initiative was that debt relief should be additional to other aid flows. 
 
 
IV.   CAN THE HIPC INITIATIVE ACHIEVE ITS GOALS? 
 
A.   Debt Sustainability Outlook After HIPC Relief
16 
 
HIPC relief will reduce the level of debt of HIPCs to that of other developing countries or 
below, and will lower debt service payments to historical lows. The level of relief provided 
under the HIPC Initiative should be sufficient for these countries to embark on a path of 
sustainable debt—baring shocks that fundamentally change these countries’ macroeconomic 
conditions for a prolonged period of time. The challenge for HIPCs is to remain on such a 
path—HIPC relief is a one-time step debt reduction, not an ongoing guarantee of debt 
sustainability. Long-term debt sustainability, in constrast, is a dynamic concept. It depends 
not only on (i) the existing stock of debt and its associated debt service, but also on (ii) the 
evolution of a countries’ fiscal and external repayment capacity, as well as on (iii) the growth 
and terms of new borrowing.  
 
The HIPC Initiative can only deal with the existing stock of debt and with its associated debt 
service. The other two elements fall beyond the Initiative’s scope and more under the 
responsibility of HIPC governments. They can only be addressed if HIPCs successfully 
implement a complex set of policies that determine the likely future trend of economic 
growth and new external borrowing.
17 These policies include sound macroeconomic 
management; growth-friendly structural policies, including infrastructure, trade, tax and 
social policies, regulatory frameworks that affect economic incentives and the incentives for 
                                                 
16 The debt outlook of the 22 HIPCs that had passed their decision points at the time was 
analyzed in a joint World Bank/IMF paper, “The Challenge of Maintaining Long-Term 
External Debt Sustainability”, www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/2001/lt/042001.htm. This 
subsection draws partially on that paper. 
17 For an analysis of the relationship between “Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction in 
Sub-Saharan Africa,” see paper by G. Moser and Toshihiro Ichida, IMF Working Paper, 
WP/01/112 (2001).   - 36 - 
 
private investment and production; governance and a reduction in corruption; and social 
inclusion, which embraces the full participation of society through education and other social 
services that reach the poor. All of these elements should be reflected in a country’s PRSP, 
the approach adopted in 1999 to help poor countries and their development partners 
strengthen the impact of their common efforts on poverty reduction.
 18 
 
In the past in many HIPCs, a failure to implement such policies consistently and thoroughly, 
together with other factors such as external shocks, armed conflicts, etc., contributed to an 
unsustainable debt build-up. Long-term debt sustainability can only be achieved if these 
underlying causes of debt problems have been adressed. HIPC relief cannot by itself address 
them or change the underlying vulnerabilities of HIPCs.
19 
 
To maintain debt sustainability after debt relief and over the longer run, both players on the 
debt side need to act. As part of the policies outlined in their PRSPs, HIPCs borrowers need 
to follow more prudent debt management policies, and pay more attention to the terms of 
new borrowing and debt service obligations falling due.
20 More timely and comprehensive 
debt accounting is also a crucial element in this. An active debt management strategy should 
be formulated and integrated into a country’s overall macroeconomic management. This 
would also help improve overall economic management. Given that HIPCs’ external debt has 
been primarily contracted by the public sector, and that their external-sector imbalances have 
been often the result of fiscal imbalances, a strong fiscal position and sound fiscal 
management are crucial. A solid and comprehensive fiscal framework is in fact a condition 
for effective debt management. 
 
                                                 
18 For policy and country documents on poverty reduction strategies and general information, 
see www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp. To date, 32 countries have prepared interim 
PRSPs, and 4 countries full PRSPs. Some 20 more full PRSPs are expected later this year. In 
light of this, the IMF and World Bank have launched comprehensive reviews of PRSPs and 
the IMF's concessional lending facility, the PRGF. More information is on the website. 
19 Apart from their low-income levels, such vulnerabilities include their narrow export base 
that basically relies on a few export products, which makes them susceptible to externally-
induced shocks; their small and declining shares in world trade; and their dependence on 
capital inflows, evidenced in the persistent an external current account deficits. 
 
20 For a few countries the decision point documents projected debt ratios to remain above 
150 percent of exports at the completion point. In some cases projected export trends were a 
contributing factor, but the role of new borrowing in their future debt burdens was also 
important: for the seven countries with the highest remaining debt ratios, new borrowing 
between the decision and completion points accounted for almost 50 percentage points of the 
NPV-to-exports ratio at the completion point. This shows the importance of prudent new 
borrowing policies for HIPCs.   - 37 - 
 
Creditors and donors, for their part, must ensure that HIPC relief is additional to other aid 
flows, and they should provide new resources on more concessional terms. They should 
direct aid flows more effectively to countries with solid and comprehensive poverty-
reduction strategies—including a policy environment conducive to sustainable economic 
growth—and that are serious in their implementation efforts. Untying aid is another step 
creditors and donors should take to help HIPCs (and developing countries more generally) 
improve their economic situation, as well as trade liberalization that makes their domestic 
markets more accessible so that HIPCs can increase their export earnings and diversify their 
production and export base. 
 
B.   Debt Relief and Poverty Reduction 
 
Putting debt relief resources to good use will be essential for creditor governments to be able 
to continue to support HIPCs and gain approval of their parliaments to maintain and possibly 
increase resources for development aid. But this holds not only for debt relief, but also, and 
perhaps more so, for the use of aid flows in general. Over the years a number of donors have 
resorted to providing project assistance over general budgetary support in an effort to have 
more control over the use of the funds and assurances that the money was not wasted. This 
has resulted in an inordinate administrative burden on recipient countries which had to cope 
with numerous reporting and documenting requirements that differed from one donor to the 
other.  
 
The formulation of poverty reduction strategies by low-income countries and the 
participatory process leading to it seeks to improve on this state of affairs by clearly stating 
overall development priorities that reflect a national dialogue. These strategies seek to 
finance investment that will generate jobs and economic growth and allow a reduction in 
poverty, as well as to tackle more immediate humanitarian crises such as HIV/AIDS and 
other diseases. Significant and sustained poverty reduction in such countries can only result 
from sustained economic growth. Creditors and donors are adjusting their support 
mechanisms away from individual projects and keying them into country’s PRSPs instead, 
relying on government’s PRSP implementation reports rather than requiring individual 
donor-specific accountability. 
 
By freeing up resources and helping to channel them toward social spending and other 
pro-poor programs, the HIPC Initiative makes an important contribution, but much more is 
needed as discussed above. Additional debt relief may not be the best means of achieving 
poverty reduction as it would likely be directed to those countries with the highest remaining 
debts, not necessarily the most needy or deserving countries.  
 
For PRSPs to succeed, apart from aid flows, other sources of funding of social spending and 
other development priorities are clearly needed. These include, notably, the HIPCs’ own 
resources, especially tax receipts. The generation of domestic revenue relative to GDP is low 
in many HIPCs, which contributes to the aid-dependency of many countries. This is an 
important element of macroeconomic policies in several countries, and points again to the 
need for HIPCs to achieve and maintain a strong fiscal position.   - 38 - 
 
 
The challenge for many HIPCs is to ensure the effective and efficient use of all of the 
resources available to them. This means that they prepare well-designed poverty reduction 
strategies, and are able and willing to implement them. It also requires transparency in the 
use of public resources and accountability of the government. IMF and World Bank staff are 
working with HIPC governments to ensure that resources, in particular the proceeds of debt 
relief, are well spent. This means helping countries to ensure that money gets to areas like 
health, education, and other priority poverty reduction programs, and that it is used 
efficiently. But results cannot be guaranteed. 
 
One problem is that very few HIPCs have adequate mechanisms to track where and how 
(extra) resources are spent. IMF, Word Bank, and other donors are working to help build 
public expenditure management capacity.
21 Also, in the past it has been hard to identify the 
benefits of higher social spending in improved social indicators. It is important to help the 
recipients of debt relief avoid frittering away the gains through inefficiency and corruption. 
 
Finally, as these considerations suggest, the contribution of the HIPC Initiative to poverty 
reduction should not be seen in isolation or only in terms of resources freed up. For the 
HIPCs, the Initiative’s implementation goes hand in hand with the PRSP process, and often 
resources from debt relief are crucial for PRSP implementation. The combination of debt 
relief and the PRSP process is potentially a quite powerful one if countries are serious about 
the formulation of their poverty reduction strategies and implementation. As recent literature 
on the effectiveness of foreign aid have concluded,
22 aid is likely to have a significant impact 
on growth and poverty reduction if directed to countries that are in great need and have a 
policy environment conducive to putting resources to good use. The HIPC Initiative’s 
requirement that countries accumulate a track record of good policy implementation before 
they start benefiting from debt relief is intended to ensure such a growth-friendly policy 
environment. Experience has shown that external support can only be effective if it reinforces 
sound policies implemented by HIPCs themselves and leads to higher resources being 
directed to social development and poverty reduction. Debt relief and ODA are most 
important not in isolation, but as help for self-help. 
 
                                                 
21 See the joint IMF/World Bank paper “Tracking of Poverty-Reducing Public Spending in 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs)”, http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/2001/track/. 
22 See, e.g., World Bank, “Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why”, 
(hppt://www.worldbank.org/html/extpb/assess.htm); Tsikata, Tsidi M., “Aid Effectiveness: A 
Survey of the Recent Empirical Literature”, Policy Development and Review Department, 
IMF, Working Paper, PPAA/98/1 (1998). 
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The Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries— 
Key Features and Progress 
 
 
To address the problems of poor countries, the World Bank and the IMF jointly launched in 
September 1996 the Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) to reduce the 
external debt burdens of all the eligible HIPCs to sustainable levels, provided they carry out 
strong programs of macroeconomic adjustment and structural reforms. In October 1999, the 
modalities of the Initiative were revised in light of the increased emphasis on poverty 
reduction in IMF- and Bank-supported programs. The Initiative built on earlier debt relief 
from official creditors, mainly in the context of Paris Club reschedulings.  
 
This Appendix gives a summary of the key features of the HIPC Initiative, the enhancements 
to the framework adopted in the fall of 1999 and progress in implementation thus far. 
 
The Key Features of the HIPC Initiative 
 
The Initiative is intended to deal comprehensively with the overall external debt burden of 
eligible countries within a reasonable period of time. A country can be considered to achieve 
external debt sustainability if it is expected to be able to meet its current and future external 
debt-service obligations in full, without recourse to debt relief, rescheduling of debts, or the 
accumulation of arrears, and without compromising economic growth. Debt relief under the 
HIPC Initiative is provided in two stages (Figure A1):  
 
In the first stage, the debtor country needs to demonstrate the capacity to use prudently 
whatever debt relief is granted by adhering to IMF- and World Bank-supported economic 
adjustment programs. During this period, the country will receive debt relief from Paris Club 
creditors under traditional mechanisms (usually a flow rescheduling on Naples terms) and 
concessional financing from the multilateral institutions and bilateral donors. 
 
At the beginning of the second stage, when the decision point under the Initiative is reached, 
the Executive Boards of the IMF and World Bank determine on the basis of the results of a 
debt sustainability analysis whether the full application of traditional debt relief mechanisms 
(Paris Club stock-of-debt operation on Naples terms involving a 67 percent NPV reduction 
with at least comparable action from non-Paris Club official bilateral and commercial 
creditors) would be sufficient for the country to reach sustainable levels of external debt, or 
whether additional assistance would be required under the Initiative. In the latter case, the 
IMF and the Bank would commit to granting debt relief, provided the country continues 
implementing macroeconomic reforms and structural adjustment policies, including 
strengthened social policies aimed at reducing poverty. At the same time, Paris Club 
creditors provide additional debt relief through a flow rescheduling, and commit to providing 
at the end of the second stage, when the completion point has been reached, a stock-of-debt 
operation. The full amount of debt relief by the IMF and the World Bank will be provided at 
the completion point as well, on the condition that other creditors (including multilateral    APPENDIX  I 
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development banks, commercial creditors and non-Paris Club official bilateral creditors) 
participate in the debt relief operation on comparable terms. 
 
How the enhanced HIPC Initiative works 
 
Following extensive consultations with interested parties from civil society and the Group of 
Seven meeting of heads of states in Cologne in June 1999, the Boards of the IMF and the 
World Bank agreed to a revision of the HIPC Initiative, to make debt relief broader, deeper 
and faster, while strengthening the link between debt relief and poverty reduction. While the 
principle of providing debt relief in two stages and the crucial importance of implementing 
IMF- and Bank-supported adjustment programs remained unchanged, the number of eligible 
countries increased, the amount of debt relief each eligible country will receive was raised, 
and its delivery accelerated. The modalities of the enhanced HIPC Initiative can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
Targets of debt relief 
 
•  The external debt burden of a poor country is deemed sustainable, if the net present value 
of debt does not exceed 150 percent of exports or 250 percent of fiscal revenue. Under 
the original Initiative, the target for the NPV of debt-to-exports ratio was  
200–250 percent, and for the debt-to-revenue ratio 280 percent. 
 
•  Eligibility for assistance under the fiscal window is subject to thresholds for the openness 
of an economy (export-to-GDP ratio) of 30 percent (was 40 percent under the original 






•  The calculation of debt relief is based on actual debt data at the decision point; under the 
original Initiative, the committed debt relief was based on projections for the completion 
point. In most cases, this change in the calculation is likely to result in higher assistance 
since the debt ratios typically decline as economic reforms take hold. As a result of this 
change, there will no longer be a need for automatic reassessment at the completion point 
of the amount of assistance to be provided.  
                                                 
23 The fiscal window under the Initiative has been established to ensure that highly indebted 
poor countries with very open economies may have access to debt relief, even if they do not 
meet the minimum NPV of debt/export ratio. The identification of countries with 
exceptionally open economies is based on the exports/GDP ratio. The threshold for the 
revenue/GDP ratio aims to exclude those countries from debt relief under the fiscal window 
that exceed the targeted NPV of debt/revenue ratio because of serious shortcomings in their 
revenue mobilization efforts.    APPENDIX  I 
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Delivery of assistance  
 
•  The delivery of debt relief by the IMF and the World Bank under the enhanced HIPC 
framework starts in the form of interim assistance immediately after reaching the 
decision point, with the remainder of the debt reduction provided at the completion 
point.
24 Other multilateral institutions are expected to provide assistance on comparable 
terms. In contrast, under the original framework, debt relief was provided by international 
financial institutions only after reaching the completion point. 
 
•  Paris Club creditors will provide assistance through a flow rescheduling on Cologne 
terms (with 90 percent NPV reduction), covering the period of the second stage followed 
by a stock-of-debt operation at the completion point to deliver the balance of the required 
debt relief. Under the original framework, Paris Club creditors provided debt relief on 
Lyon terms, with 80 percent NPV reduction.  
 





•  During the second stage, the country will need to make significant progress in stabilizing 
the economy, implementing structural reforms, and reducing poverty. The completion 
point will be reached when the country has met the agreed conditions for a floating 
completion point, which include the following:  
 
•  The debtor country will need to continue to implement the financial and economic 
programs supported by the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and the World 
Bank aimed at achieving stable macroeconomic conditions. 
  
•  To strengthen the link between debt relief and poverty reduction, the enhanced Initiative 
requires the preparation and implementation of a nationally owned, comprehensive 
poverty reduction strategy, as reflected in a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).
25 
A PRSP, prepared in broad consultation with civil society, should be in place and broadly 
endorsed by the Boards of the IMF and the Bank when a country reaches its decision 
point under the enhanced HIPC Initiative. During a transition period, a decision point 
may be agreed before the completion of a full PSRP on the basis of an interim PRSP, 
                                                 
24 In general, interim assistance provided by the IMF is subject to an upper limit of 
60 percent of total assistance under the Initiative, and may not exceed the annual amount of 
debt-service obligations due to the IMF.  
25 The strategy should include measures to improve the delivery of social services, improve 
expenditure controls and budget management, and strengthen external debt management.     APPENDIX  I 
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which summarizes the government’s objectives of its poverty reduction strategy. In all 
cases, substantial progress in implementing the poverty reduction strategy is an important 
condition for reaching the completion point under the Initiative. 
 
•  Other creditors will need to confirm their participation in the debt relief operation. 
 
Duration of the second stage 
 
•  Under the original framework, the length of the period between the decision and 
completion points (the second stage) was at least three years, assuming that the country 
would implement IMF- and Bank-supported medium-term adjustment program according 
to schedule. The enhanced Initiative has adopted a more flexible approach with a floating 
completion point that will be reached when key structural reforms and certain major 
poverty reduction measures specified in the PRSP have been implemented, which could 




Thirty-seven countries are expected to qualify for assistance under the enhanced HIPC 
Initiative, most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa. As of end-July 2001, 23 countries had 
reached their decision points under the enhanced framework (Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia), and Uganda and Bolivia had also reached their completion 
points (Table A1). Total committed assistance to these 23 countries is $34 billion in future 
debt service savings, or $21 billion in NPV terms, representing an average debt reduction in 
net present value terms of more than 55 percent on top of traditional debt relief mechanisms. 
In addition, Côte d’Ivoire had reached its decision point under the original framework; the 
assistance committed to Côte d’Ivoire will be reassessed under the enhanced Initiative.  
 
Total costs of the HIPC Initiative are estimated at $33 billion in 2000 NPV terms (or 
$42 billion including the difficult cases of Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan), which fall about 
half to multilateral creditors and half to other creditors (Table A2). The costs of HIPC relief 
for the 23 countries that have already passed their enhanced decision points account for 
almost two-thirds of the total cost of the Initiative, and this would rise to over 70 percent 
once the three countries for which preliminary documents have been issued have reached 
their decision points possibly later this year. 
 
For more information on the HIPC Initiative, see the IMF and World Bank websites, where 
all related policy and country documents are posted in www.imf.org/hipc 
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Table A1. HIPC Initiative: Status of Country Cases Considered Under the Initiative, August, 2001
Target Estimated Total
NPV of Debt-to- Assistance Levels  1/ Percentage Nominal Debt
Decision Completion Gov.  (In millions of U.S. dollars, present value) Reduction Service Relief 
Country Point Point Export  revenue Total Bilat- Multi- IMF World in NPV of (In millions of
 (in percent) eral lateral Bank Debt 2/ U.S. dollars)
Completion point reached under enhanced framework
Bolivia 1,302        425          876          84              194        2,060           
   original framework Sep. 97 Sep. 98 225 448          157         291         29              54         14               760             
   enhanced framework Feb. 00 Jun. 01 150 854          268         585         55              140        30               1,300          
Uganda 1,003        183          820          160            517        1,950           
   original framework Apr. 97 Apr. 98 202 347          73           274         69              160        20               650             
   enhanced framework Feb. 00 May 00 150 656          110         546         91              357        37               1,300          
Decision point reached under enhanced framework
Benin Jul. 00 Floating 150 265          77            189          24              84          31                460              
Burkina Faso 398          56            342          42              162        700              
   original framework Sep. 97 Jul. 00 205 229          32           196         22              91         27               400             
   enhanced framework Jul. 00 Floating 150 169          24           146         20              71         27               300             
Cameroon Oct. 00 Floating 150 1,260        874          324          37              179        27                2,000           
Chad May. 01 Floating 150 170          35            134          18              68          30                260              
Gambia, The Dec. 00 Floating 150 67            17            49            2                22          27                90                
Guinea Dec. 00 Floating 150 545          215          328          31              152        32                800              
Guinea-Bissau Dec. 00 Floating 150 416          212          204          12              93          85                790              
Guyana 585          220          365          74              68          1,030           
   original framework Dec. 97 May 99 107 280 256          91           165         35              27         24               440             
   enhanced framework Nov. 00 Floating 150 250 329          129         200         40              41         40               590             
Honduras Jun. 00 Floating 110 250 556          215          340          30              98          18                900              
Madagascar Dec. 00 Floating 150 814          457          357          22              252        40                1,500           
Malawi Dec. 00 Floating 150 643          163          480          30              331        44                1,000           
Mali 523          162          361          58              182        870              
   original framework Sep. 98 Sep. 00 200 121          37           84           14              44         9                 220             
   enhanced framework Sep. 00 Floating 150 401          124         277         44              138        28               650             
Mauritania Feb. 00 Floating 137 250 622          261          361          47              100        50                1,100           
Mozambique 1,970        1,235       736          140            434        4,300           
   original framework Apr. 98 Jun. 99 200 1,716       1,076       641         125            381        63               3,700          
   enhanced framework Apr. 00 Floating 150 254          159         95           16              53         9                 600             
Nicaragua Dec. 00 Floating 150 3,267        2,145       1,123       82              189        72                4,500           
Niger Dec. 00 Floating 150 521          211          309          28              170        54                900              
Rwanda Dec. 00 Floating 150 452          56            397          44              228        71                800              
Sao Tome & Principe Dec. 00 Floating 150 97            29            68            -             24          83                200              
Senegal Jun. 00 Floating 133 250 488          193          259          45              124        19                850              
Tanzania Apr. 00 Floating 150 2,026        1,006       1,020       120            695        54                3,000           
Zambia Dec. 00 Floating 150 2,499        1,168       1,331       602            493        63                3,820           
Decision point reached under original framework
Côte d'Ivoire Mar. 98 Mar. 01 141 280 345          163          182          23              91          6                  3/ 800              
Total assistance provided/committed 20,833      9,779       10,955     1,755         4/ 4,951     34,680         
Preliminary HIPC document issued  5/  
Ethiopia ... ... 150 1,028        352          649          37              395        42                1,650           
Ghana ... … 250 2,096        1,002       1,095       122            767        55                3,200           
Sierra Leone ... ... 150 551          188          326          121            119        79                867              
Sources: IMF and World Bank Board decisions, completion point documents, decision point documents, preliminary HIPC documents, and staff calculations.
1/ Assistance levels are at countries' respective decision or completion points, as applicable.
2/ In percent of the net present value of debt at the decision or completion point (as applicable), after the full use of traditional debt-relief mechanisms.
3/ Nonreschedulable debt to non-Paris Club official bilateral creditors and the London Club, which was already subject to a highly concessional
restructuring, is excluded from the NPVof debt at the completion point in the calculation of this ratio.
4/ Equivalent to SDR 1,386 million at an SDR/USD exchange rate of 0.7900, of May 1, 2001.
5/ Figures are based on preliminary assessments at the time of the issuance of the preliminary HIPC document; and are subject to change. - 44 -







1/  Recognizing the need for flexibility in exceptional cases.
Paris Club stock-of-debt operation under Naples terms 
and comparable treatment by other bilateral and 
commercial creditors 
                       is not sufficient
for the country to reach external debt sustainability.
========>   World Bank and IMF Boards                
determine eligibility for assistance.
Paris Club stock-of-debt operation under Naples 
terms and comparable treatment by other bilateral 
and commercial creditors
                       is adequate
for the country to reach external debt sustainability     
========> Exit
(Country does not qualify for HIPC Initiative 
assistance)
All creditors (multilateral, bilateral, and commercial) commit debt relief to be 
delivered at the floating completion point. The amount of assistance 
depends on the need to bring the debt to a sustainable level. This is 
calculated based on latest available data at the decision point.
   Timing of completion point for nonretroactive HIPCs (i.e., those countries that did not qualify for treatment under 
the original HIPC Initiative) is tied to at least one full year of the implementation of a comprehensive poverty 
reduction strategy, including macroeconomic stabilization policies and structural adjustment.  For retroactive HIPCs 
(those countries that did qualify under the original HIPC Initiative), the timing of the completion point is tied to the 
adoption of a complete PRSP.
  All creditors provide the assistance determined at the decision point; interim debt relief provided between 
decision and completion points counts toward this assistance.
  All groups of creditors provide equal reduction (in NPV terms) on their claims as determined by the sustainability 
target. This debt relief is provided with no further policy conditionality.
     -- Paris Club provides stock-of-debt reduction on Cologne terms (90 percent NPV reduction or higher if needed) 
on eligible debt.
     -- Other bilateral and commercial creditors provide at least comparable treatment on stock of debt. 1/
     -- Multilateral institutions provide debt relief, each choosing from a menu of options, and ensuring broad and 
equitable participation by all creditors involved.
   Country establishes a second track record by implementing the policies determined at the decision point (which 
are triggers to reaching the floating completion point) and linked to the (Interim) PRSP. 
     World Bank and IMF provide interim assistance.
     Paris Club provides flow rescheduling on Cologne Terms (90 percent debt reduction on NPV basis or higher if 
needed)
     Other bilateral and commercial creditors provide debt relief on comparable terms. 1/
     Other multilateral creditors provide interim debt relief at their discretion.
     All creditors continue to provide support within the framework of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy 
designed by governments, with broad participation of civil society and donor community.
   Country establishes three-year track record of good performance and develops together with civil society a 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP); in early cases, an interim PRSP may be sufficient to reach the 
decision point.
   Paris Club provides flow rescheduling on Naples terms, i.e. rescheduling of debt service on eligible debt falling 
due (up to 67 percent reduction on a net present value basis).
   Other bilateral and commercial creditors provide at least comparable treatment. 1/         
   Multilateral institutions continue to provide adjustment support in the framework of World Bank- and IMF-
supported adjustment programs.Table A2.  HIPC Initiative: Estimates of Potential Costs by Creditor Group
March 2001 Updated Updated Total Future decision
Costing Exercise Costing Exercise Costing Exercise (In percent 23 decision point countries 1/
1999 NPV terms 1999 NPV terms 2000 NPV terms of total costs) point countries (11 countries)
(32 countries) 2/ (34 countries)  3/ (34 countries)  3/ (34 countries)  3/ (In 2000 NPV terms)
(In billions of US dollars)
Total costs 29.3 31.3 33.2 100.0 20.7 12.5
Bilateral and commercial creditors 15.1 16.1 17.1 51.4 9.8 7.3
   Paris Club 11.3 12.0 12.8 38.4 7.0 5.8
   Other official bilateral 2.6 2.7 2.8 8.5 2.6 0.3
   Commercial 1.2 1.4 1.5 4.5 0.3 1.2
Multilateral creditors 14.2 15.2 16.1 48.6 10.9 5.2
   World Bank 6.3 7.0 7.4 22.4 4.9 2.5
     Of which:  IDA 5.6 6.3 6.7 20.1 4.6 2.1
    of which:   IBRD 0.7 0.7 0.8 2.3 0.3 0.5
   IMF 2.2 2.4 2.5 7.5 1.7 0.8
   AfDB/AfDF 2.4 2.5 2.6 8.0 1.3 1.3
   IaDB 1.1 1.1 1.1 3.4 1.1 0.0
   Others 2.2 2.3 2.4 7.4 1.8 0.6
Memorandum item:
Total costs including Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan 37.3 39.2 41.6 125.4 … …
in percent of total costs n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 62.0 38.0
Sources: Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries - Review of Implementation 
(EBS/00/166, 8/14/00 and SecM2000-487, 8/14/2000); country authorities; and Fund and Bank staff estimates. 
1/ Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Ethiopia,
    Myanmar, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
2/ Excluding Comoros, Eritrea, Ghana, Lao P.D.R., Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan.
3/ Excluding Eritrea, Lao P.D.R., Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan.




Bird, G. and A. Milne, “Debt Relief for Poor Countries: Distinguishing Rhetoric from 
Reality,” mimeo, 2001.  
 
Bird, G. and A. Milne, 2000, “Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries: Is It Effective and 
Efficient,” Surrey Center for International Economic Studies, Working Paper. 
 
Brooks, Cortes, Fornasi, Ketchekmen, Metzgen, Powell, Rizavi, D. Ross and K. Ross, 1998, 
“External Debt History of ten Low-income Developing Countries: Lessons from 
Their Experience”, IMF Working Paper 98/72 (Washington: International Monetary 
Fund). 
 
Daseking and Powell, 2000, “From Toronto Terms to the HIPC Initiative: A Brief History of 
Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries”, International Economic Policy Review, 
Vol. 2, pp. 39–58. 
 
IMF/World Bank, “The Challenge of Maintaining Long-Term External Debt Sustainability”. 
Available via the Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/2001/lt/042001.htm 
 
IMF/World Bank: “Tracking of Poverty-Reducing Public Spending in Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPCs)”, Available via the Internet: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/2001/track/ 
 
Moser, Gary and Toshihiro Ichida, 2001, “Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction in 
Sub-Saharan Africa”, IMF Working Paper 01/112 (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund) 
 
OECD, “Debt and Development Co-operation: Debt Relief Actions by DAC Members”, 
1997, OCDE/GD(97)134. 
 
Ross, Doris C., and others, 2001, Official Financing for Developing Countries, World 
Economic and Financial Surveys (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
 
Tsikata, Tsidi M., 1998, “Aid Effectiveness: A Survey of the Recent Empirical Literature”, 
IMF Working Paper 98/1 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
 
World Bank, “Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why”. Available via the 
Internet: http://www.worldbank.org/html/extpb/assess.htm. 
 